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Transactions of the Nebraska Academy of Sciences- Volume VlI, 1979

ON THE CAUSAL IRREDUCIBILITY OF NATURAL FUNCTION STATEMENTS

ERIC RUSSERT KRAEMER

Department of Philosophy
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Lincoln, Nebraska 68588

One topic of interest to a number of philosophers of science is
whether functional explanation can be reduced to some other kind of
explanation, such as causal explanation. Some philosophers have tried
to reduce talk of natural functions to talk of causes. I here examine
some such attempts and try to provide, in addition to the traditional
CQunter-examples, an argument as to why such reductions should fail.
Certain parallels are drawn between attributions of natural functions to
parts of organisms and attributions of propositional attitudes to persons.

t t t
The complexity of the activities of living organisms has
impressed most students of biology. Certain biologists and
philosophers have proceeded to argue that organic life exhibits
such unusual traits that if we are to understand organic phenomena adequately we must postulate some kind of special,
non-standardly-physical entity in virtue of which biological
activity occurs_ Hans Driesch, for example, has spoken of
entelechies (I 927). Other philosophers and biologists, while
not wishing to share Driesch's enthusiasm for postulating a
special entity, have still argued that there are certain characteristic features of organic phenomena which make the
project of giving a wholly adequate explanation of biology in
terms of physics and chemistry seem an unlikely prospect.
What I shall be concerned with here is one such feature,
namely, functional explanation. By functional explanation I
mean explanations of the occurrence of some trait in an organism in terms of some function that that trait satisfies.
The claim has been made that although functional explanation
is a perfectly acceptable method of explanation of many of
the activities of living organisms, yet this sort of explanation (since the abandonment of Aristotelian physics) is not
derivable from explanation of non-organic physical activities.
Thus, if there is an acceptable mode of explanation for organic
phenomena which does not apply to non-organic phenomena,
then this fact should pose a barrier to attempts to work out
the reduction of all biology to physics. What evidence can we
Point to in favor of this claim?
Consider the standard model of scientific reduction

(Nagel, 1963). Roughly, one theory is shown to be reduced
to another if (1) all the terms of the theory to be reduced
can be defined (correlated) with terms of the reducing theory,
and (2) all the laws of the theory to be reduced can be derived,
by means of these definitions, from the laws of the reducing
theory. I will be concerned here only with the first requirement. For, obviously, if the first requirement cannot be met,
there is no point in worrying about the second.
The particular term that I wish to consider is the term
'function' as it occurs in sentences such as, "The function of
the heartbeat in mammals is to circulate the blood." As has
been noted many times, the term 'function' has many different uses. I shall here be concerned only with what we might
call the 'natural function attribution' sense of the term. That
is, I wish to discuss that sense of 'function' which we use when
we attribute a function to some biological item.
Here it might be objected that what is at stake is not the
reducibility of biology to chemico-physics but rather the
reducibility of function-attributions and functional-explanation. But if the term 'function' naturally occurs in biological
discourse, as one would suppose it must in discussions of
physiology, surely this term needs to be accounted for if one
is really to reduce biology without remainder to physics and
chemistry. (See for example, recent standard biological texts
such as Curtis, 1975 and Weiss, 1971.)
A number of philosophers have thought functionalexplanation a suspect form of explanation and have attempted
to reduce it to some other sort of non-teleological explanation.
In this paper I shall consider some attempts to reduce functional explanation to causal explanation. By a causal explanation I mean an account of the occurrence of some phenomenon which appeals to its causes. Such accounts typically
include statements of laws of nature which express causal
regularities. I shall concentrate on the attempt to reduce talk
of functions to talk of causes. If this can be accomplished,
then we would have no reason to suppose that a separate form
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of explanation need be involved in accounting for the activities of parts of organisms to which functions are naturally
attributed. The task of the proponent of the causal reduction
of functional explanation is to show how the following function-attribution schema can be accounted for in strictly causal
terms:
(F) The function of X is Y.
One might try to hold that (F) comes to no more than

still does not give us an adequate analysis of (F). (J) is to
liberal an account, as it cannot handle the problem of heart~
sounds raised earlier. For, although in the normal mamrn I
the beating of the heart is causally necessary for ·the produa
tion of heart-sounds, this production is not a function of t;'
beating of the heart. Furthermore, (1) is also too restrictive
an analysis. Part of an organism (for example, the right kidne e
in a human) can have a function (to purify the blOod of i~
purities) without that item being naturally causally necessary
for satisfying the function (after all, we can get by with only
one kidney).

(G) X is causally sufficient for Y.
One might try to support this by noting, in terms of the above
example, that the beating of the heart in mammals is causally
sufficient for the circulation of the blood. However, a little
reflection reveals that a more cautious claim needs to be made
here, namely:
(H) X usually causes Y.

Let us grant, therefore, that neither appeals to causal
necessity nor causal sufficiency will work. Yet we should not
I think, be tempted to suppose that function-attributions d~
not involve causation at all. We may certainly grant that (F)
does entail:
(K) In system S, X typically contributes
causally to Y.

For, with respect to our example, the beating of the heart will
not result in the circulation of the blood unless the heart is
properly connected with the rest of the body (is, for example,
not resting by itself in a saline solution). But (H) by itself will
not do. One traditional counter-example to this sort of account is that, whereas the beating of the heart usually causes
heart sounds, it is not (we assume) a function of the beating
of the heart to produce heart-sounds. Thus, (H) is too broad
to be an adequate analysis of (F).

Even if (K) does not give us a reductive analysis of (F) (for
example, it cannot handle the problem of the heart-sounds),
it is still important to note that in attributing a function to an
item we are also asserting that there clearly is a causal con.
tribution relationship between the elements in question. For
example, if the beating of the heart did not typically contrib.
ute causally to the circulation of the blood in normal mam.
mals, we would not be inclined to attribute the function of
circulating the blood to the beating of the heart.

Another attempt at reducing function-attributions involves construing them as causally necessary conditions for
some state-of-affairs. Thus, one might propose that (F) comes
to no more than:

At this point we might be tempted to modify (K). Let us
note that what seems to be problematic about the case of
heart-sounds is that the production of heart-sounds by the
beating of the heart seems not to contribute naturally to any
goal of the normal mammal. With this in mind we might then
try to modify (K) as follows:

(I) X is a causally necessary condition for Y.
Modifying our example to (I), we might claim that the beating
of the heart is a causally necessary condition for the circulation of the blood. Here again, there is a traditional counterexample. For the existence of artificial heart-machines which
make possible the circulation of the blood demonstrates that
the beating of the mammalian heart is not causally necessary
for hlood circulation. Therefore, (I) is too restrictive to be an
adequate analysis of (F).
One might try to salvage the strategy behind (1) by noting
that one only attributes functions to items that are parts of
some natural system (Gruner, 1965). Thus we may attempt to
accommodate (F) as:
(J) In system S, X is causally necessary for Y.
Thus, if we let She thc nornuzl mammal, then we may avoid
the problem that heart-machines raised for (l). However, (1)
ISO

(L) In S, X causally contributes to Y and Y is some
goal, G, of S, or Y contributes causally to G.
(L) does allow us to distinguish between the spurious heart·
sounds case and our paradigm example of blood circulation.
However, (L) is not all that happy a result. For althoughil
does not contain the term 'function,' it nonetheless does make
use of a concept which is just as teleological, namely the
concept of a goal. Thus, in order to carry out the present
project it seems that a reductive non-teleological analysis
needs to be provided for the concept of a goal.
While I doubt that such an analysis can be given, I will
offer no specific arguments to that effect here. (For further
discussion of these and further attempts to reduce function'
attributes, see Nissen. 1971. Compare also, Bunge, 1963.)
What I wish to present here is a theory as to why the above
reductions faiJ. r suggest that there is a kind of irreducible

"directedness" in function-attributions which is responsible
for the failure of the above attempts at analysis. This notion of
. reducible directed ness is, admittedly, rather vague. To make
1: somewhat more precise, let us consider an analogous phe\omenon in the philosophy of mind. In discussing the ques~ion of whether or not there is a unique characteristic of
mental phenomena, Franz Brentano held that every mental
henomenon had the property of being directed upon an
~bject which need not exist (Brentano, 1973). The property of
being directed upon an object which need not exist, or, as it
is presently known, of intentionality, does seem to be a characteristic of a group of mental phenomena called propositionalattitudes. (These include such phenomena as believing, knowing, desiring, hoping, despising, fearing, etc.) To motivate
this notion of being directed upon an object which need not
exist, consider the sentence:
(M) Smith believes that Zorinsky is prudent.
smith's belief, we may say, is directed on Zorinsky. But the
truth of (M) surely does not imply that Zorinsky exists. For
note the sentence:

Note that this neatly fits our belief sentence (M). For consider:
(M) Smith believes that Zorinsky is prudent.
(0) Zorinsky

= Nebraska's senior senator.

(P) Smith believes that Nebraska's senior senator is
prudent.
From (M) and (0) we cannot deduce (P). This criterion also
seems to fit our function-attribution sentence:
(Q) The function of heart beating in mammals is to
promote the circulation of the blood.
(R) The circulation of the blood is the activity most
commonly used as a philosophical example of a
biological activity.
(S) The function of heart beating in mammals is to
promote the activity commonly used as a philosophical example of biological activity.

(N) Smith believes that Santa Claus is benevolent.
Various formal criteria have been proposed to capture Brentano's intuition that there is some distinctive feature of psychological attitudes (Manas, 1972).
It is not my purpose here to explore the question of
whether there is an adequate criterion of this feature of intentionality. Instead, what I do wish to point out is that it
has proved most difficult to reduce causal claims about external behavior and internal states. Some have held that it is
the intentionality of propositional-attitudes which is responsible for this. What I wish to suggest here is that, similarly, it is
a sort of intentionality, or directedness on a state-of-affairs
or condition which need not exist, which is responsible for the
failure of the above attempt to reduce natural function statements to statements of causal relations.

To support this contention, let us consider, for example,
the following, which has been proposed as a criterion of the
intentionality of propositional attitudes:
(C l ) A [further] mark of intentionality may be described in this way. Suppose there are two names
or descriptions which designate the same things
and that E is a sentence obtained merely by
separating these two names or descriptions by
means of "is (are) identical with." Suppose also
that A is a sentence using one of those names or
descriptions and that B is like A, except that,
where A uses the one, B uses the other. Let us
say that S is intentional if the conjunction of
A and E does not imply B (Chisholm, 1957).

From (Q) and (R) it seems that we cannot deduce (S). But
consider a causal case:
(T) Heart beating causes heart noises.
(U) Heart noises are my favorite noises.

(V) Heart beating causes my favorite noises.
In this case it is clear that the inference from (T) and (U) to
(V) certainly goes through.
To strengthen my argument, let us consider another
rough criterion of in tentionaJity (or "directedness"):
(C 2 ) A sentence expressing a dyadic-relation (a relation between two elements) is intentional if the
truth of the sentence and the existence of either
element of the relation does not entail the existence of the other element of the relation.
Let us apply this criterion to our examples. First, with respect
to belief; the truth of (M) and existence of Smith doesn't
entail existence of Zorinsky. Second, with respect to functionattributions, the truth of (Q) and existence of a heart-beating
doesn't entail existence of a blood-circulation. But, third, with
respect to causal-attribution, the truth of (T) and existence of
heart-beating does entail existence of heart noises.
Thus we have two criteria of intentionality which apply
to both propositional-attitudes and function-attributions but
not to the attribution of causes. What I hope to have suggested
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here, then, is that there are certain properties which are such
that: (1) propositional-attitude sentences and function-attribution sentences share them, (2) causal-attributions lack them,
and (3) these properties intuitively are expressed in the phrase
"directed on an object or state-of-affairs which need not
exist. "
What follows from this? Certain philosophers have held
that persons are best to be understood as a sort of thing with
two different sorts of properties, (1) purely causal physical
properties, and (2) psychological properties, arguing this on
the grounds that the latter sort of property cannot be reduced
to the former. Some biologists also hold that organisms are
best understood as a sort of thing with two different sorts
of properties: purely causal physical properties, and functional properties. I have tried to consider here a sort of argument to support this latter view, which also unifies it with
the former.
In response to my remarks someone might argue that a
dual-properties view, such as I suggest, need not be accepted
because teleology is an anthropomorphic concept (Simon,
1968). The proper reply, I think, to this remark is that we
should not take the denial of the dual-properties position
seriously until we can produce either a reductive account of
teleological notions, like function, or a convincing reason
that these teleological concepts can be dispensed with. And
both of these tasks, it seems to me, remain to be done.
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